AKWA IBOM STATE CIVIL SERVICE — A MICROCOSM (REPRESENTATION) OF STAGNATION AND INEFFICIENCY — WHERE COMMISSIONERS AND PERMANENT SECRETARIES PLAY JUNTA
It was President Ulysses S. Grant — whose campaign platform in 1871 — emphasized the elimination of patronage appointments in the federal civil service. The reason was to keep politics away in order to uphold the commission’s independent status, as well as sustain the enduring values of the civil service in its everyday activities.
But while the quality of the United States’ civil service has sustained for more than 150 years — devoid of external influence and politics — having recently dissolved as part of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (as there was the need for effective functionality); the Nigerian civil service which we copied and adapted to our context, has stagnated — bogged down by the worse form of anti-bureaucratic practices. It puts to shame efforts of intelligent men long ago — who contemplated the importance of predicating the everyday running of government on a transparent, efficient machinery.
In Akwa Ibom State, the civil service is a microcosm representation of the whole; of how politics — being the main driver of pervasive corruption — impacts bureaucracy in Nigeria. It may have started from the very moment appointments of people into key positions in the civil service was politicized. Today, you have commissioners appointed into the service who are political hustlers; who bring zero experience and expertise to the job, and are not motivated by the responsibility of office and the importance to preserve the highest standards of conduct in public life. These people enter the civil service with their loyalty lying elsewhere, conscious that the service is neither independent nor accountable. They saunter about the place with the ersatz seriousness of the real bureaucrat, demigod even. Big-time crooks, these ones. They subjugate lower authority and run their offices Machiavellian-style. They make decisions only after evaluating self-interest, and are rarely found in their seats. Oh, when they are — which they always act like there are more pressing matters to attend to away from office — it is always for a matter that has to do with funds, or photo ops (to give their principal employer the impression of performance).
They never hide their disgust for the civil service. Those of them who can’t stand the toxicity of the environment annex their office and operate from home or hotel suite. Whereas, the core job of a commissioner consists primarily of overseeing operations and sitting down with management/staff to hold brainstorming sessions — where ideas are developed and policies are formulated for the improvement of public productivity.
And the same can almost be said about permanent secretaries. With the principle of merit-based career advancement having been replaced with politics of interest and patronage appointments (typically the questionable hiring of people from the private sector and filling them in as permanent secretaries), senior civil servants at the director level (going on permanent secretary) no longer rely on the system as set in place to advance them in rank. They now outdo one another pushing pawns, lobbying and scheming for positions. Those who eventually hold key positions or become permanent secretaries are the real salesmen con-artists. As seasoned civil servants, they know just how to traverse the economic grey areas of the system; they will take out the many years of unrewarding service on the new office, racketeering and enriching self, conscious of the limited time they got left in service.
In the mid-level and further down is the rat race. The league for small-time hustlers, the regular civil servants who scurry for mid-range strategic positions and favorable postings. These ones get into a position of advantage and they don’t let go, not without a fight. You don’t want to know how dirty it can get. Ten years? Fifteen years? These hangers-on will play the office politics at their level and would do anything to stay put. They will forge a criminal understanding among themselves and would become the ‘principalities’ and ‘powers’ of their various MDA; the force thereof capable of overthrowing the president of a small nation.
Ultimately, the day-to-day running of the government is predicated on a system that is the mainstay of cronyism. A system of low level transparency and accountability: where workers are motivated by personal gains and operational funds are diverted and shared among the top echelon. Typically, a greedy commissioner dreaded for his political antecedence or ruthlessness — will divert funds meant for the running of a ministry — leaving barely enough for the primary purpose it was meant for. A classic example would have to be in one of the major revenue-generating ministries of the state — manned by a name known for his crude methods and use of gutter language; a formidable racketeer who is not suited to occupy any position founded on established public norms.
It is said that he drives a hard bargain. That by the end of the first quarter of this year alone he had diverted about 50% of all monies entering his ministry, with more than half a billion of the said sum unaccounted for — although retired on record. Perhaps that is putting it mildly, because like they say, he runs the ministry like an ill-tempered air-headed junta — who offers no expertise and adds no depth to the ministry. That the minute the ministry’s account is credited, he would have such funds immediately emptied and handed to him — from whence he chooses to do with it as he pleases. That on one occasion, he had braggingly complained to a group of people that at the level and social status he was at, he couldn’t boast of 4 billion Naira that was his own; hinting on the notion that he is in a place where there is not enough money to take from. To think that this is coming from a man who is a no nouveau riche — highlights what is fundamentally wrong with the civil service — and summarizes the saying “putting the fox in the henhouse”. It exposes the greed, treachery and high-handedness of people holding key positions in the MDAs.
In another case, a commissioner and a corroborating permanent secretary split between themselves funds meant for the running of their ministry. This would have to be the Bonnie and Clyde of civil service corruption; because not unusually, when a commissioner has a criminal understanding with a permanent secretary, you are certain to have a formidable pairing capable of anything — even the selling off of an MDA with everything in it; personnel inclusive. On the other hand, is a house of cards where a stubborn permanent secretary locks horns with a commissioner, and one would think that this would be good for the system as a permanent secretary is supposed to check the excesses of the commissioner. Well, until you realize, not incredulously, that the permanent secretary’s disgruntlement in the first place is over a sharing formula that shortchanges his personal interests.
Directors? They are not usually left out. For those who can stick one leg in the door, they get in on some of the rackets that go down. For those who can’t, they get totally sidelined and their offices rendered useless. For instance, the setup of the civil service is such that authorizes projects to go through directorates — where directors are to oversee their implementation. But in a case where the two topmost offices (commissioner and permanent secretary) are manned by corroborating, absolute conmen — ghost projects can be implemented through a directorate (in many cases on paper) — and funds retired (with the compromised corporation of both the ministry’s cashier and accountant) without the knowledge of the director. Say the director in question gets to find out, there is little to nothing he can do because the odds are so stacked against him that he would rather play ball, cutting a deal to be let in on whatever illicit deal that is going on.
And the same goes down the rank — where you have people below the banquet floor of the civil service; people who can smell all that is cooking upstairs but can do nothing except bide their time and wait out their turns. But because the civil service is a pork barrel that everybody has to take from no matter how small and by whatever means, these people will devise cunning means to take from whatever trickles down. I mean, doesn’t everybody have a reason for a breakdown in virtue? Yet, the low-level underhand office-game is not for everybody, and for those who are disadvantaged, they take to exploiting the weak enforcement mechanism of the system — either by dividing work-time between a second source of income, or opting for outright absenteeism for the same purpose; which is a precursor to ghost-working.
In the end, you have a civil service that is run abysmally: where workers — from top down — are a colony of lackadaisical selfish ants stacking up personal gains. Where government programmes and policies are hardly ever sufficiently implemented due to bad administration, crisis of confidence within ministries and agencies, financial fraud and embezzlement of funds by the upper echelon. Where there is the weakest enforcement mechanism of any organization and offices are in perpetual deplorable conditions. Where essential supplies like photocopiers, printers and computers are broken down on a permanent basis — and consumables like paper, files, stamps and writing materials are almost always exhausted. Where a most basic necessity as electricity is tricky and most ministries and agencies can go days without power — except when a commissioner is on seat. Where — despite the growth in the size and power of the civil service, there is no accompanied noticeable improvement in performance and general output.
The summary of it all, is that technically, Nigeria is operating an outdated civil service template that is 150 years behind time, has refused to structurally reform, whilst consistently and vehemently resisting the incorporation of technology. And because effective civil service performance is a prerequisite for sustainable development, you can but argue that a greater source of Nigeria’s many failings is its primary instrument of executing government programmes and policies. Perhaps the question is no longer what needs to be done to turn things around for good — because the answer is an open secret and we can haggle about it forever. Perhaps the real question carries a foreboding note of impending darkness and critical urgency; it is the question of how much longer we can endure the compounding negative effects of bad governance. By all means, it is the question of how imminent we can have a crucial turning point and who to lead it and from where; perhaps a governor who could muster the political will to pursue radical and progressive change. A governor who will step forward and say, ‘enough! let’s reform, let’s do it right, let’s show them how…’
Perhaps that is what it will take: one state doing it right; one state taking from the playbook of Lee Kuan Yew and the many examples that abound of people who defied all odds to rewrite history; just one state with a proven template for success, or maybe not, because after all, to self-sabotage, to fail, is the long-term biological and political imperative of the (black) African man.
My name is Akpama Ntia, I am a patriot.
